Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
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Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
Read Less
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $89.36, fair condition, Sold by Goodwill of Greater Milwaukee rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Milwaukee, WI, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by Mit Pr.
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Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $144.05, new condition, Sold by BEST BOOK rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Richardson, TX, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by Mit Pr.
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $175.15, new condition, Sold by Just one more Chapter rated 3.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Miramar, FL, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by Mit Pr.
