The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid- ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree- ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the ...
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The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid- ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree- ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi- tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
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Add this copy of Axiomatic Models of Bargaining to cart. $30.00, very good condition, Sold by Accounting text rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Edgewood, KY, UNITED STATES, published 1979 by Springer.
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Very good. Trade paperback (US). Glued binding. 126 p. Contains: Illustrations, black & white. Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems, 170. Audience: General/trade.
Add this copy of Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (Volume 170) to cart. $45.35, fair condition, Sold by Anybook rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Lincoln, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1979 by Springer-Verlag.
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Volume 170. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside. This book has soft covers. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Library sticker on front cover. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item, 350grams, ISBN: 0387095403.
Add this copy of Axiomatic Models of Bargaining to cart. $93.93, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 1979 by Springer.
Add this copy of Axiomatic Models of Bargaining to cart. $116.74, new condition, Sold by Ria Christie Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Uxbridge, MIDDLESEX, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1979 by Springer.
