By offering a critical assessment of the evolution of standard game theory, this book argues for a shift in the ontology and methodology of game theory for appraising games, one based on understanding the players' strategic reasoning process. Analyzing the history of economic thought, the book highlights the methodological issues faced by standard game theory in its treatment of strategic reasoning and the consequence it has on the status of players' beliefs. It also highlights how the two original contributions of T. C. ...
Read More
By offering a critical assessment of the evolution of standard game theory, this book argues for a shift in the ontology and methodology of game theory for appraising games, one based on understanding the players' strategic reasoning process. Analyzing the history of economic thought, the book highlights the methodological issues faced by standard game theory in its treatment of strategic reasoning and the consequence it has on the status of players' beliefs. It also highlights how the two original contributions of T. C. Schelling and M. Bacharach can be applied to these issues. Furthermore, the book assesses the intersubjective dimension in games by applying the cognitive sciences and by integrating simulation theory into game theory. Consequently, this book offers an interdisciplinary approach for reassessing the nature of the intersubjectivity involved in strategic reasoning. It shows that the analysis of games should involve the study and identification of the reasoning process that leads the players to a specific outcome, i.e., to a specific solution. A game should not be understood (as is done in standard game theory) as a mathematical representation of an individual choice at equilibrium. This requires investigating the players' capacity for coordination. Understanding the process of coordination allows us to understand strategic reasoning and ultimately to provide new answers to the indeterminacy problem, one of the central hurdles in game theory, and one that underscores its normative difficulties.
Read Less
Add this copy of On Coordination in Non-Cooperative Game Theory: to cart. $43.60, good condition, Sold by Books From California rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Simi Valley, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Springer.
Add this copy of On Coordination in Non-Cooperative Game Theory: to cart. $101.86, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Santa Clarita, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Springer.
Add this copy of On Coordination in Non-Cooperative Game Theory: to cart. $122.11, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 2023 by Springer International Publishing AG.
Choose your shipping method in Checkout. Costs may vary based on destination.
Seller's Description:
New. Contains: Illustrations, black & white. Springer Studies in the History of Economic Thought . XVII, 340 p. 14 illus. Intended for professional and scholarly audience.
Add this copy of On Coordination in Non-Cooperative Game Theory: to cart. $123.65, like new condition, Sold by GreatBookPrices rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Columbia, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Springer International Publishing AG.
Choose your shipping method in Checkout. Costs may vary based on destination.
Seller's Description:
Fine. Contains: Illustrations, black & white. Springer Studies in the History of Economic Thought . XVII, 340 p. 14 illus. Intended for professional and scholarly audience. In Stock. 100% Money Back Guarantee. Brand New, Perfect Condition, allow 4-14 business days for standard shipping. To Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. protectorate, P.O. box, and APO/FPO addresses allow 4-28 business days for Standard shipping. No expedited shipping. All orders placed with expedited shipping will be cancelled. Over 3, 000, 000 happy customers.
